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Abstract 
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1 Introduction 
In previous decades, accelerators were developed and optimized as tools to explore the energy frontier 
for studying sub nuclear particles. However, more recently, another aspect of accelerator optimization 
has become more important, which is highly reliable operations to produce a large quantity of particle 
collisions (‘particle factories’) or photons (light sources), serving a large and diverse user community. 
The reliability aspect is particularly relevant for light sources. Light sources have large user communities 
of several thousand users organized in small independent research teams, each of which uses only a 
small fraction of the beam time. Even small operational inefficiencies due to frequent failures and 
interruptions might cause the total loss of allocated beam time of some research teams, with significant 
disruption of their science programmes. For these reasons, an increasing emphasis has been put on 
highly reliable operations. Reliability is usually defined as the total relative amount of beam time made 
available to users within the scheduled time period. A reliability of 95% is considered a tolerable lower 
limit for modern light sources. Reliability values of the order of 98% are reported frequently and are not 
an unusual achievement. This means that for a scheduled yearly beam time of for example 5000 h, only 
250 h or less of user operations may be lost due to failures. Assuming that, on average, full recovery 
from a failure requires two hours, the time between interruptions must be larger than 40 h (assuming 
24 h/d and 7 d/week of operation) on average. Science with synchrotron radiation has become very 
sophisticated and the delivery of a beam is not a sufficient criterion for reliability any more. Users need 
a beam of the planned beam energy and with nearly constant intensity, high spatial stability and high 
reproducibility of all beam parameters after changes of operational mode, such as changes in photon 
energy by changing the field strengths of undulator magnets. Accelerators consist of a large number of 
active components, many of them with high power consumption, which must function simultaneously 
to enable beam operation. They are connected and coordinated by sophisticated digital controls, and 
precision timing is usually a condition for proper functioning. For a facility with 100,000 of such 
components, any component may fail only after 4 × 106 h of operation. 
In the past, an accelerator facility needed several years or even a decade of operations to mature 
operations and develop the hardware system before such demanding operating goals could be realized. 
What appears to be desirable is to develop requirements to be taken into account in the design of the 
accelerator and in planning for its operations. Thus, accelerators must be designed for high reliability. 
When operating the facilities, all components must be maintained carefully, based on a comprehensive 
preventive maintenance programme to minimize unscheduled downtime. This involves the monitoring 
of all components over time to identify any deviation from normal functioning, so as to prevent a failure 
during operations by timely repair or replacement. 
These topics are discussed in this paper, which is organized as follows: 
̶ introduction to reliability theory and definition of relevant parameters and properties; 
̶ aspects and examples for high-reliability design; 
̶ maintenance programmes; 
̶ spares management. 
2 Short summary of reliability definitions and relationships 
2.1 General remarks 
The purpose of this section is to show how reliability relevant parameters and functions that are used to 
analyse failure statistics and to make reliability predictions are related to observable and measurable 
quantities. To provide some understanding of the underlying statistical nature of the relationships, a 
short derivation of the most important formulae from basic principles and assumptions is presented. 
In many areas of physics and engineering, the behaviour of complex, though deterministic, 
systems is described successfully by a statistical model in which events are considered random and 
independent, as insufficient detailed information about these systems is available. Random events are 
considered independent. This implies that the probability for a failure is independent of the history of 
previous failures or the failure of other components. While this is a rather practical and successful 
approach in most cases, we must keep in mind that we are dealing with deterministic systems and we 
are using the concept of statistics as a model. In particular, it should be noted at this point that the number 
of components in the systems considered is small, so the uncertainty of statistical prediction is 
considerable. Moreover, one needs to be aware that failures and different times or in different 
subsystems are not independent, adding another element of uncertainty to the outcome of statistical 
modelling. 
Let us consider the following example: 
A circuit breaker trips due to external overvoltage and a large number of magnet power supplies 
lose power and trip. During recovery from the event, one supply is found to be damaged from that 
occurrence and needs to be repaired. The two failures, the circuit breaker trip and the power supply 
failure, are clearly not independent. The power supply would most likely not have failed and continued 
to function for a while. However, it is also quite likely that the power supply would have failed at a 
somewhat later time during normal operating procedures, such as turn-off–turn-on cycles because there 
must have been a hidden defect, as power supplies are designed to survive power failures. Such events 
might be considered quasi-independent. However, there are strongly dependent failures, such as a large 
cooling-water leak causing water to penetrate a power supply, which may lead to corrosion and 
subsequent failure. Such events are usually fairly rare and do not have a large statistical significance. 
For now, we will assume that there are no significant dependencies of failures and that the statistical 
failure model is adequate. 
2.2 Mean time between failure 
The mean time between failures (MTBF) is an important observable parameter, which can be related to 
other statistical functions and parameters related to failure occurrence and system reliability. For a single 
component, it is simply defined as the average time between two failure events, which is the number of 
failures in a certain time period. This assumes that the system can be restored or repaired after a failure 
event. For non-repairable components one just averages the time to failure for a number of components. 
This is quite intuitive and, as we will see, the equivalency of these two definitions can be shown. To 
assess the impact of failure, another quantity is quite relevant; the time it takes on average to return a 
failed system to service, the mean time to repair (MTTR). The availability of a repairable system is 
defined as Availability =  1 − MTTRMTBF +  MTTR . 
Where a system consists of different constituents or subsystems (labelled here by index i), the 
availability can be written as Availability = ��1 − MTTR𝑖𝑖MTBF𝑖𝑖  +  MTTR𝑖𝑖�𝑖𝑖  ≅ 1 −� MTTR𝑖𝑖MTBF𝑖𝑖  +  MTTR𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , for MTBF ≫  MTTR . 
To predict statistical failure behaviour, it is useful to introduce the concept of an instantaneous failure 
probability, which is closely related to the MTBF. We define p as the probability for a failure to occur 
in a small interval of time ∆t. For the time being, we assume that p is the same for any interval of time, 
 𝑝𝑝 = 𝜆𝜆 ∙ Δ𝑡𝑡 ,  
where λ is called the instantaneous failure rate. If λ is constant in time, the failure density distribution, f, 
or the probability of surviving a certain number n − 1 of time intervals but failing in the nth time interval 
is 
𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛∆𝑡𝑡 = [1 − 𝑝𝑝]𝑛𝑛−1 𝑝𝑝 , 
and fn is a normalized distribution with 
�𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛 = 1∞
𝑛𝑛=1
 , 
using 
�𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛
∞
𝑛𝑛=0
= 11 − 𝑞𝑞  for |𝑞𝑞| < 1  . 
The MTBF can be interpreted as the expectation value of the time to failure for the density distribution, 
thus  
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 = < 𝑛𝑛 > ∆𝑡𝑡 =  �𝑛𝑛 ∙ [1 − 𝑝𝑝]𝑛𝑛−1 𝑝𝑝∞
𝑛𝑛=1
∙ ∆𝑡𝑡 = 
−𝑝𝑝 ∙ ∆𝑡𝑡 ∙
𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
∑ ∙ [1 − 𝑝𝑝]𝑛𝑛−1 𝑝𝑝∞𝑛𝑛=1 ∙ ∆𝑡𝑡 = −𝑝𝑝 ∙ ∆𝑡𝑡 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 1𝑑𝑑 = ∆𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑 = 1𝜆𝜆. 
This is an important relationship, which allows us to relate the parameters of statistical functions to 
observations: MTBF = 1/λ. Note that this simple relationship holds only for time-independent 
instantaneous failure rates but that an equivalent relationship can be given for more complicated cases 
of time dependent λ(t) (called the hazard function) as well. 
2.3 Failure and survival functions 
The failure and survival functions are important tools to predict failures. The failure function FN gives 
the probability that failure occurs within a time N⋅∆t. It is given as the sum over the failure distribution 
density up to a time N⋅∆t: 
𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁 = �𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛 = 1 − (1 − 𝑝𝑝)𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁
𝑛𝑛=1
 . 
The survival function SN is the complement of the failure function and gives the probability that the 
system will survive for a time N⋅∆t. 
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁 = 1 −  𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁  . 
2.4 Systems with identical components 
Accelerators are built with subsystems which contain identical components. The considerations of the 
previous section can be generalized to include multicomponent systems. Assume a system of N identical 
components, each component having an instantaneous failure probability of λ⋅∆t; (λ is also called the 
hazard function). The probability of m components failing during a time ∆t is then: 
𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = �𝑁𝑁𝑚𝑚� ∙ (1 − 𝑝𝑝)𝑁𝑁−𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁 . 
Note that PNm is a normalized distribution function with 
� 𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = (𝑞𝑞 + 𝑝𝑝)𝑁𝑁|𝑞𝑞→1−𝑑𝑑 = 1𝑁𝑁
𝑁𝑁=1
 . 
The average number of failed components within a time interval ∆t is, as might have been expected: 
〈𝑚𝑚〉 = � 𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ∙ 𝑚𝑚 = 𝑝𝑝 dd𝑝𝑝 (𝑞𝑞 + 𝑝𝑝)𝑁𝑁|𝑞𝑞→1−𝑑𝑑 = 𝑁𝑁 ∙ 𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁
𝑁𝑁=1
 . 
The likelihood to have no failure in the time interval is 𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁0 = (1 − 𝑝𝑝)𝑁𝑁. When computing the MTBF 
for the system with N components, 1 − p in the equation for the MTBF for one component in Section 
2.2 has to be replaced by (1 − 𝑝𝑝)𝑁𝑁: MTBF =  ∆𝑡𝑡1 − (1 − 𝑝𝑝)𝑁𝑁 ≅ ∆𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁 ∙ 𝑝𝑝 = 1𝑁𝑁 ∙ 𝜆𝜆 . 
Thus the MTBF for the system with N components is N times smaller than for a single-component 
system as one might have assumed intuitively. 
2.5 Non-constant failure rates 
So far, we have assumed that the probability for failure within ∆t is constant in time. However, there are 
many reasons for a non-constant instantaneous failure rate. New systems have a certain fraction of 
components with hidden defects, leading to enhanced failure rates early in the life cycle. Many 
components wear-out or age as a result of other effects (damage due to repetitive high temperature, 
accumulation of dust and aggressive chemicals, change of material properties, such as elasticity, with 
time and so on). Another reason for time dependence of failures is changing external conditions, such 
as temperature and humidity. Systems with high voltage, for example, tend to develop arcs if the 
humidity of the air changes. Another parameter is the time since the last maintenance, during which 
mechanical clamps might loosen or dust might have accumulated. 
For these reasons, to describe real systems, we must develop the formalism under the assumption 
that λ is not constant but may depend on time. 
We start with the assumption that p is the probability for a failure within a short interval of time 
∆t, but that the probability may vary for different time intervals labelled n. Thus p → pn = λn⋅∆t. The 
failure density distribution then becomes 
𝑓𝑓𝑁𝑁 ∙ Δ𝑡𝑡 =  𝜆𝜆𝑁𝑁 ∙ ∆𝑡𝑡 ∙�(1 − 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛 ∙ ∆𝑡𝑡)𝑁𝑁
𝑛𝑛=1
 . 
The expression for f is more conveniently represented by a continuous function by making the time steps 
infinitesimally small. To make this transition we rewrite the probability density distribution f as: 
𝑓𝑓𝑁𝑁 =  𝜆𝜆𝑁𝑁 ∙ exp �� ln(1 − 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛∆𝑡𝑡)𝑁𝑁
𝑛𝑛=1
� . 
At this point, we can make the transition ∆t → 0 and write, correspondingly, 
𝑓𝑓𝑁𝑁 =  lim𝑁𝑁→∞ �𝜆𝜆𝑁𝑁 ∙ exp �� ln(1 − 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛∆𝑡𝑡)𝑁𝑁
𝑛𝑛=1
�� . 
Since 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛∆𝑡𝑡 is approaching zero, the logarithm can be expressed in terms of its Taylor expansion, ln(1 − 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛∆𝑡𝑡) → −𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛∆𝑡𝑡 , 
resulting in 
𝑓𝑓𝑁𝑁 =  lim𝑁𝑁→0 �𝜆𝜆𝑁𝑁 ∙ exp ��−𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛∆𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁
𝑛𝑛=1
��   , 
and this leads to 
𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡) = 𝜆𝜆(𝑡𝑡) ∙ exp �−� 𝜆𝜆(𝜏𝜏)d𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡
0
� . 
The failure function F(t), which gives the probability of failure within the interval [0,t] is the integral 
over the probability density distribution f(t): 
𝑀𝑀(𝑡𝑡) =  � d𝜃𝜃𝜆𝜆(𝜃𝜃) ∙ exp �−� 𝜆𝜆(𝜏𝜏)d𝜏𝜏𝜃𝜃
0
� = 1 − exp �−� 𝜆𝜆(𝜏𝜏)d𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡
0
�  .𝑡𝑡
0
 
The complement of the failure function is the survival function S(t), which gives the probability of 
surviving a time t without failure: 
𝑆𝑆(𝑡𝑡) =  exp �−� 𝜆𝜆(𝜏𝜏)d𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡
0
� . 
The instantaneous failure rate may be expressed by F(t) and S(t): 
𝜆𝜆(𝑡𝑡) =  dd𝑡𝑡 𝑀𝑀(𝑡𝑡)
𝑆𝑆(𝑡𝑡)  . 
Now we can express the MTBF in terms of the continuous functions that we have derived. The MTBF 
is the expectation value of the time until failure using the probability density distribution, 
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For example, if λ constant: MFBF =  � d𝑡𝑡 exp �−� 𝜆𝜆 d𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡
0
�
∞
0
= � d𝑡𝑡 exp[−𝜆𝜆 𝑡𝑡] = 1
𝜆𝜆
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With these functions, we are now able to calculate an expectation value for the medium residual 
lifetime MRL(t) of a system that has survived a certain time t without failure. We use a similar 
expression to that for calculating the MTBF, except that the integral now extends from time t to infinity 
and the expression is divided by the probability of survival up to the time t, since only cases that have 
survived up to time = t are being considered  MRL(𝑡𝑡) =  ∫ 𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡 + 𝜏𝜏) ∙ 𝜏𝜏 ∙ d𝜏𝜏∞0
𝑆𝑆(𝑡𝑡)  , 
MRL(𝑡𝑡) = ∫ d𝜏𝜏 𝑆𝑆(𝑡𝑡 + 𝜏𝜏)∞0
𝑆𝑆(𝑡𝑡)  . 
Note that for statistical failures, i.e., S(t) = exp(−λt), MRL = 1/λ, which is identical to MTBF. 
2.6 Statistical modelling of real systems 
A useful parameterization for describing the failure statistics of real systems is the Weibull 
parameterization. The parameters of the Weibull model can be chosen so as to describe any of the three 
failure modes discussed so far: premature failure, statistical failure, and wear-out or ageing-related 
failure. Weibull was a Swedish engineer who introduced his model in the 1930s [1] in the context of 
describing fatigue and wear-out and this model has been applied to many use-cases. Since then, many 
modified or alternative parameterizations have been proposed and successfully applied (see, for 
example, Ref. [2], and quotations therein). However, it would stray too far from the purpose of this 
lecture to discuss them all. In the Weibull model, the instantaneous failure probability function 𝜆𝜆(𝑡𝑡) is 
described as 
𝜆𝜆(𝑡𝑡) =  𝑎𝑎
𝑏𝑏
�
𝑡𝑡
𝑏𝑏
�
𝑎𝑎−1
 
The probability density distribution for failures in the Weibull model is 
𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑎𝑎
𝑏𝑏
�
𝑡𝑡
𝑏𝑏
�
𝑎𝑎−1
∙ exp �− �𝑡𝑡
𝑏𝑏
�
𝑎𝑎
� . 
The probability for failure is then F(t) = 1 − exp �−�t
b
�
a
� . 
The parameter b is a lifetime parameter, which for a = 1 equals the MTBF. The parameter a 
describes the nature of the failure statistics. If a < 1, the model describes early, premature, failure, where 
the failure probability decreases with increasing time; a = 0 describes the case where the failure 
probability function is constant, which is referred to as the statistical failure mode; a > 1 describes an 
increasing failure rate with increasing time, as expected for wear-out and ageing. If a > 1, the stronger 
the deviation from a = 1, the sharper the probability density distribution f(t) peaks around the lifetime 
value t = b. For a < 1, the closer a is to zero, the faster the decay but the slower the approach of 
probability to failure to F = 1. A real system has elements of all three phases of failure. The hazard 
function for various values of a is depicted in Fig. 1.  
Given an inventory of identical components, a certain fraction, c1, will fail prematurely, another 
fraction, c2, will fail statistically and the majority of the components, c3, will fail due to wear-out and 
ageing. The total probability for failure is a weighted sum of the three components, 
𝑀𝑀(𝑡𝑡) = �𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ∙ �1 − exp �− � 𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖�𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖��3𝑖𝑖=1  . 
The survival function is then written as 
𝑆𝑆(𝑡𝑡) =  �𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ∙ exp �− � 𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖�𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖�  .3𝑖𝑖=1  
The MTBF in the Weibull model is more complex than in the simple case of purely statistical failure, 
and is MTBF = 𝑏𝑏 ∙ Γ ∙ �1 + 1
𝑎𝑎
 � . 
 
Fig. 1: Instantaneous failure rate in the Weibull model for different form factors a and lifetime b 
3 Accelerator design for high reliability 
3.1 General remarks 
In Section 2, we discussed the three modes of failure: premature, statistical, wear-out, and ageing. 
Combining the three modes of failure in one graph, one obtains the so-called bathtub curve (see Fig. 2) 
with an initially enhanced failure rate, a steady but lower failure rate in the middle and an enhanced rate 
at the end of the components’ life cycle. The way the accelerator complex is designed, constructed, and 
operated has a large impact on the failure rate in all three phases. 
Premature failure can be reduced by careful quality assurance and inspection of purchased 
components. Suppliers should be chosen based on proven reliability records and good workmanship. 
Often, hidden damage occurs during transport. The purchasing contract should include requirements for 
shock, temperature, and humidity detectors as part of packaging the components for transport. 
Considerable effort should be invested in acceptance testing the equipment. The tests should be 
comprehensive but safe, as damage of sensitive equipment during acceptance testing might occur. 
The wear-out and ageing phase can be strongly influenced by regular maintenance, preventive 
maintenance, operating the equipment below maximum power rating, controlling the installed 
equipment’s environment in terms of temperature, humidity, and dust, and exposure to aggressive 
chemicals. 
All three phases of failure, however, are influenced by how the accelerator, and its subsystems 
and components, are designed. The following sections will discuss various aspects of high-reliability 
accelerator design. 
 
Fig. 2: The ‘bathtub’ curve of system failures over the entire life cycle 
The overall optimization of an accelerator system is a compromise between three major 
considerations, which may lead to conflicting requirements. These are cost, performance, and reliability. 
The challenge of building a new accelerator facility is to find solutions that support all three 
requirements satisfactorily. 
3.2 High-reliability design considerations 
Next, we discuss some of the main considerations of high-reliability design. This will be followed by a 
more detailed discussion of examples. 
3.2.1 Overall complexity 
The more complex a system is, the higher the probability for hidden errors, or wrong or incompatible 
sets of parameters. These errors may ‘sleep’ within the system up to the point where special parameters 
in particular configurations are required. Troubleshooting in complex systems can be very time 
consuming. So, the complexity and interdependence of systems, which are, of course, unavoidable, 
should be minimized in a high-reliability design. 
3.2.2 Unavoidable weakness 
Some weakness in the design with respect to high reliability is thus unavoidable. For example, the 
accelerator beam will most probably be lost if there is a failure of a magnet power supply or if the RF 
system trips. The designers should be aware of these weaknesses and mitigate the risk of failure, for 
example, by reducing the number of individual supplies or installing spares as hot spares. 
3.2.3 Subsystem architecture 
The architecture of the subsystems, which defines their interdependence and their common failure 
modes, plays an important role in mitigating reliability risks. The system should be designed and 
configured such that failure in one component does not start a chain of failures in other components. 
3.2.4 Fail-safe design 
Provision for component failure is a part of every good design, to avoid collateral damage in case a 
failure occurs. 
3.2.5 Overrated design 
An effective way to achieve good reliability is overrated design. High-power components, such as 
magnet power supplies, RF transmitters, RF cavities, and pulsed magnet systems, are particularly 
susceptible to failure, with a potential for collateral damage. Operating these systems at the highest 
performance implies that operating at the temperature limit or with the maximum tolerated mechanical 
vibrations will shorten the components’ lifetimes and increase the probability of failure. However, 
overrating goes along with increased cost and may not always be affordable. 
3.2.6 Environmental impact 
Changing environmental conditions, for example, by varying temperature, increasing humidity, 
changing from a dry and dusty environment to a humid environment, or exposure to aggressive 
chemicals (for example, created by synchrotron radiation) are important factors of failures. Protecting 
the equipment from such influences will be a major contribution to high reliability. 
3.2.7 Built-in redundancy and hot spares 
Built-in redundancy is an effective way of minimizing downtime, even if a failure does occur. 
Redundancy, however, may be quite costly. Hot spares are spares that need to be available anyway, to 
avoid long downtimes during repair or replacement but that are already installed place, ready to be used 
if the primary component fails. The combination of the two concepts is very effective, to avoid large 
downtimes and the additional cost may be relatively moderate. 
3.2.8 Built-in diagnostics 
Built-in diagnostics, preferably with post-mortem analysis capabilities, is a strong tool to detect potential 
failures before they occur or to identify quickly the root cause of failure, thereby speeding up repair and 
recovery from failure. Built-in diagnostics comes with a cost and must be compromised in a cost-
effective design. In each case, the designs should have provisions for integrating built-in diagnostics at 
a later date without the necessity for major design changes. 
3.2.9 Repair and maintenance-friendly design 
Failures do happen in any complex technical system. This fact needs to be taken into account when 
designing the system. A modular concept makes it easy to diagnose and isolate the source of an error. 
The mechanical layout should take into account that systems need to be easily accessible for quick 
repair. The system must include well-documented and easily assessable measurement points for quick 
diagnosis. 
3.2.10 Documentation 
The effort to produce and maintain complete, up-to-date and readily available comprehensive 
documentation will pay for itself when errors occur in complex systems. While large documentation is 
usually needed for procuring and building components, the maintenance of documentation in the 
operational phase is often neglected, owing to lack of resources. This might be the cause of long repair 
and recovery. 
3.3 Subsystem architecture 
A basic choice is to choose either a compact design, which combines many functions and features 
implemented in the same hardware, thereby saving on redundant components, or a modular design. The 
modular design is friendlier for troubleshooting and repair. It also allows more easily for the 
incorporation of hot spares. When coupling the two types of approach, attention needs to be paid to 
avoid accumulating disadvantages with respect to reliable operations. 
Consider, for example, a number of switched-mode power supplies. These devices are supplied 
with a constant d.c. voltage from individual supplies or from a common supply. The supply turns the 
d.c. input into a pulsed voltage with a rectangular pulse shape via a fast switch, operating at a fixed 
frequency in the kilohertz range. The pulse length is varied to achieve the desired output current. The 
output filter turns the rectangular waveform into a d.c. current. 
The first, though expensive, solution is to provide a d.c. voltage supply for each individual 
switched-mode supply. 
The second, more economical, solution is to provide a common d.c. voltage source. One can even 
go one step further by implementing a multichannel power supply, which has, besides the common d.c. 
voltage input, other common components, such as an auxiliary voltage supply for power supply 
electronics, and interlock and alarm features. This approach turns the switched-mode power supply 
system into a cost-effective compact system. The disadvantage is that most of the failures in one supply 
or channel will cause the common voltage supply to be shut off. All the switched-mode units supplied 
by the voltage source will be tripped as a consequence. Recovery involves restoring a large number of 
power supplies. Often, a few supplies need some extra effort to return them to service. The impact of a 
simple trip can be considerable. The lifetime of all the supplies turned off unnecessarily is affected. 
A design developed at SLAC overcomes this disadvantage [3] by adding two isolation switches, 
which separate the failing switched-mode supply from its voltage source. The voltage supply thus 
remains turned on and all the other switched-mode supplies are decoupled. While this adds both cost 
and complexity, it appears to be a good compromise and will achieve considerably higher reliability 
performance. 
3.4 Fail-safe design 
Fail-safe design is good engineering practice, to protect a device from its own failures. However fail-
safe designs that might provide optimum protection of the device might not be favourable for high 
reliability. Perfect protection of a device implies many trips, with many of them not being necessary to 
protect the device. Figure 3 illustrates the dilemma. Consider two redundant sensors for the protection 
of a device. Combining the two signals via a logical AND gate establishes an enhanced reliability system 
with little chance of false trips, but the protective function is not perfect and a faulty sensor might lead 
to damage of the device. This case is not fail-safe. In the opposing case, where the two signals are 
combined by a logical OR gate, the device is fairly well protected but false signals will lead to 
unnecessary trips. Reliability is compromised in this case. A system with three sensors will mitigate the 
shortcoming if combined as shown in Fig. 4. 
Variable trip thresholds are also a good way to overcome the fail-safe dilemma. Early in operation, 
when there is little or no experience with the device, the trip threshold can be set low. After operational 
experience has been gained and the entire operation is matured, the thresholds can be raised, thereby 
reducing the probability of unnecessary trips. These must be part of the design from the beginning. It is 
also important to design a system to administer and safeguard parameters, to avoid equipment damage 
resulting from incorrect parameters. 
 
Fig. 3: Fail-safe versus high-reliability protection 
 
Fig. 4: Fail-safe and high-reliability arrangement of three sensors 
3.5 Built-in redundancy 
Built-in redundancy has the potential for improving the reliability of a system considerably. It will not 
reduce the failure rate but it will reduce the MTTR significantly. It might also offer a convenient way to 
perform preventive maintenance while keeping the system running. Closely related to built-in 
redundancy are hot spares. Hot spares are spare components that are installed in the system and can be 
switched into service without much effort and in minimum time. 
Consider a system with two redundant components, labelled 1 and 2, with failure functions F1(t), 
F2(t). The system fails if the two components fail in the same period of time. The components will be 
redundant only if the failed redundant components are repaired immediately after discovery of failure. 
This implies that all inactive components of a redundant system need to be checked for full functionality 
at regular intervals. Let the time between functional tests be tc. Another assumption needed for full 
redundancy is that failures of the redundant components would be completely independent and 
uncorrelated (which in a real-use case would have to be verified carefully). The redundant system will 
fail if the two systems fail simultaneously within a time tc. The corresponding failure function F(tc) is 
𝑀𝑀(𝑡𝑡c) = 𝑀𝑀1(𝑡𝑡c) ∙ 𝑀𝑀2(𝑡𝑡c) = �1 − exp �−� 𝜆𝜆1(𝑡𝑡′)d𝑡𝑡′𝑡𝑡c
0
�� ∙ �1 − exp �−� 𝜆𝜆2(𝑡𝑡′)d𝑡𝑡′𝑡𝑡c
0
�� . 
Let us consider a well-matured system with constant (statistical) failure rate, 
� 𝜆𝜆1(𝑡𝑡′)d𝑡𝑡′𝑡𝑡c
0
= 𝜆𝜆1 ∙ 𝑡𝑡c , 
and let us assume that 𝑡𝑡c ≪ MTBF or 𝜆𝜆1 ∙ 𝑡𝑡c ≪ 1. In this case, the failure function is approximated as 
𝑀𝑀(𝑡𝑡c) =  𝜆𝜆1𝜆𝜆2𝑡𝑡c2. 
Thus by the choice of tc, the failure probability of the redundant system can be made arbitrarily small 
under the assumption of uncorrelated failures. The MTBFr of the redundant system is then MTBFr = �𝜆𝜆1𝜆𝜆2𝑡𝑡c2𝑡𝑡c �−1 = MTBF2𝑡𝑡c . 
For, example, consider a system of two redundant components with a MTBF of 480 h for each 
component. If the system is checked daily, the probability of failure will be (24/480)2 = 1/400 and the 
MTBFr of the redundant system is 9600 h. 
If there are n parallel components that need to be active simultaneously, the MTBFs for the system 
is n times the MTBFc of a single component, according to the considerations in Section 2. However, if 
there is one built-in (hot) spare, the MTBFs of the system is given by MTBFs = MTBFc2𝑡𝑡c ∙ 𝑛𝑛  . 
Figure 5 shows as an example a crate with five switched-mode power supplies developed at DESY 
in 2000 (J. Eckoldt, private communication), one of which is redundant. Assuming a MTBF of 100,000 h 
for each supply, and assuming that the function of the redundant supply is checked once per month, the 
MTBF is improved to 347,000 h by using the redundant component. Thus, with an increase of less than 
25% in cost, the reliability of the device is increased by a factor of 3.5. 
 
Fig. 5: Crate with five switched-mode power supplies, one of them being redundant (courtesy of J. Eckoldt, DESY) 
3.6 Redundant safeguards 
The case of pairs of redundant components can be easily generalized for a system of n safeguards. Each 
individual safeguard (labelled i) has a mean time between failure of MTBFi. Each safeguard is checked 
at regular intervals ∆t. The MTBFs for the redundant system of safeguards is then MTBFs =  ∏ MTBF𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1Δ𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛−1  . 
This shows that by increasing the number of safeguards, the reliability of the redundant system is 
increasing enormously. However, this is only true if ∆t <  MTBFi, that is, if the components are checked 
at regular, sufficiently small, intervals. It is also important that the redundant components are as diverse 
as possible to reduce the probability of correlated failures. 
3.7 Overrated design 
Overrating of high-power components has a number of positive effects on the lifetime and probability 
of failure of the components. These have mainly to do with operating temperature. The operating 
temperature will be less in an overrated device as the cooling is designed for larger power dissipation 
than the power dissipated in normal operating conditions. The change in temperature when the device 
is turned on and off will also be reduced. This leads to reduced mechanical stress. All these factors will 
increase lifetime and reduce failure rate. In the electronics industry, the following Arrhenius-based 
expression is used to describe the impact of temperature and temperature changes on the failure rate [4]: 
𝜆𝜆
𝜆𝜆0
=  �Δ𝑀𝑀
Δ𝑀𝑀0
�
2
∙ exp �− 𝐸𝐸
𝑘𝑘𝑀𝑀
∙ �1 − 𝑀𝑀
𝑀𝑀0
��. 
The first factor describes the effect of thermal cycling and fatigue; the second factor describes the 
thermal stress due to high temperature. The index ‘0’ indicates a reference temperature level for 
comparison. The parameter k is Boltzmann’s constant, and E is a typical excitation energy level that 
leads to changes in the material under consideration 
Thus, overrating leads to a reduction in the failure probability. Another positive effect is that the 
system can be operated further away from critical limits and trip thresholds, thereby reducing the number 
of false trips. On the negative site is increased cost and, in many cases, increased installation space 
requirements. 
3.8 Environmental impact: dust, humidity, temperature 
In Section 3.7, we discussed the impact of temperature and temperature changes on the lifetime and on 
the probability of failure. The impact of temperature on the lifetime of electrolytic temperature is 
pronounced and well understood. Manufacturers quote the following expression for the lifetime, based 
on Arrhenius law (see for example, Ref. [5]): MTBF(𝑀𝑀) = MTBF(𝑀𝑀ref) ∙ 2−�𝑇𝑇−𝑇𝑇ref10 ℃ �. 
Figure 6 shows how the lifetime of film capacitors is affected by internal temperature, which is 
determined by ambient temperature and internal heat production. Similar behaviour is observed for 
electrolytic capacitors. 
 
Fig. 6: Lifetime of film capacitors as a function of internal temperature 
Exposure to changing humidity and dust are other environmental factors that can significantly 
compromise the reliability of technical components. 
Dust may have constituents that are electrically conducting and could cause electrical shorts 
between connectors on electrical printed circuit boards. Once a current is flowing, the printed circuit 
board material can become carbonized, which aggravates the short to the point that the electronic 
component becomes non-functional. Needless to say, such a process can be accelerated by the presence 
of humidity or of chemical radicals in the air. Such radicals may be produced by synchrotron radiation, 
which is produced by high-energy electron beams in the accelerator tunnel. The malfunction in such 
cases may develop only gradually and slowly and may initially only cause occasional failures. The cause 
of such failures can be very difficult to find and repeated failures may cause significant downtime. 
Figure 7 shows a board in the quench protection system of the Tevatron (Fermilab) superconducting 
magnet system that was damaged by this effect (H. Edwards and P. Czarapata, Groemitz Miniworkshop 
on Accelerator Reliability (Groemitz) 2005, unpublished data).The combination of dust and humidity 
caused some mysterious modulator trips in the RF system of the HERA electron–positron collider at 
DESY, Hamburg. In the late 1990s, a high frequency of arcing on the modulator was reported. In an 
attempt to explain the events, they were analysed as a function of air humidity and dust particles in the 
air. There was no clear correlation. However, after further investigation, it was found that the arcs always 
occurred when the outside weather conditions changed from dry to humid periods. A small amount of 
outside air had been added to the circulating, well-conditioned, internal airflow. During dry periods, 
small amounts of dust from the outside air accumulated on the surface of high voltage (≈70 kV) carrying 
components. When the humidity increased, the dust particles acted as launch points for arcs into the 
slightly more humid air in the modulator room. Thus, even a tiny amount of exposure to environmental 
conditions can have surprisingly large effects. 
 
Fig. 7: Damage to quench protection board as a result of dust and humidity 
An effective, though not quite inexpensive method, was chosen to mitigate the environmental 
impact on electronics in the new synchrotron light source, NSLS-II, at Brookhaven National Laboratory. 
All electronics components are enclosed in a sealed rack system, in which air is circulated around the 
equipment for cooling and is then cooled with water-to-air heat exchangers. This method has the 
advantage of keeping cooling water away from the magnet power supply and other electrical equipment 
and maintaining air cleanliness and low humidity. As power dissipation is low in all devices, air cooling 
is sufficient to maintain favourable operating temperatures. Figure 8 shows the NSLS-II rack system. 
3.9 Error-prone solutions 
In reviewing the cause of failure in accelerator equipment, there are two outstanding items. The first one 
is leaking cooling water, which can cause electrical shorts, damage of electrical equipment, or the 
formation of acidic liquid, which will lead to corrosion. While large leaks are detected easily and the 
recovery from a large leak is straightforward, small leaks may remain unnoticed and a large amount of 
damage might result before the problem is noticed. For this reason, water cooling systems have to be 
designed and manufactured with great care. Wherever air cooling can be used instead of water cooling, 
air cooling should be given preference. Water piping should, if possible, be installed underneath delicate 
equipment rather than overhead. Double floors that provide a space to accommodate water piping are 
an expensive but effective solution to avoid damage by cooling-water accidents. An example of a water-
free cooling design is the air cooled sealed NSLS-II power supply enclosure mentioned previously (see 
Fig. 8), which keeps cooling water away from electrical components. Water cooling circuits should be 
regularly checked for pressure drop and the design should foresee an efficient way of performing such 
tests frequently. 
Another frequent source of failure is cable terminations and connectors. The list of potential issues 
is long and spans from assembly errors, insufficient ground connections, corrosion, and mechanical 
damage, cable damage at the fitting, miswiring, and confusion of connectors after repair or test. The root 
cause is that cable connections often have to be mounted in the field under sometimes difficult 
conditions, such as limited space, visibility, accessibility, dust, etc. For this reason, it should be checked 
from case to case whether analogue hard-wiring can be replaced by digital data connections, which offer 
the ability to replace many critical electromechanical connectors and switches. To save cost on cable 
connections by using cheap components and inexpensive labour might not be an optimum decision in 
view of the loss in reliability caused by low-quality connectors and poor workmanship. It is advisable 
to design a comprehensive quality-control programme to assure the adequacy of cable connections. To 
reduce the risk of slowly developing poor connectivity, the use of gold-plated connectors is encouraged. 
In the case of high-current bolted cable connectors, the materials have to be carefully chosen to match 
in thermal expansivity, to avoid premature wear-out of the bolting elements. 
 
Fig. 8: NSLS-II sealed racks (equipment enclosures) 
3.10 Built-in diagnostics 
The next two topics are strongly related to operation and maintenance of high reliability, but have to be 
considered during the design and construction phase of a facility. The first topic is built-in diagnostics. 
Usually, a failure announces itself by more or less significant changes in some of the analogue variables 
inside a device. Therefore, it is helpful in both preventing and analysing a failure if the internal analogue 
variables of a technical device are measured, recorded, logged, distributed, and analysed. Thus, built-in 
diagnostic tools have the potential to increase the MTBF and reduce the MTTR of a component or 
system. 
Comprehensive capturing of relevant internal data has to be well integrated in the design of a 
device, component, or system. With increasing complexity of a technical system, the need of internal 
diagnostics for supporting preventive maintenance and troubleshooting becomes more crucial. There 
are many examples of good implementation of built-in diagnostics. The cost of the additional design 
and construction effort is not negligible. However, it will be extremely difficult to achieve reliabilities 
above 95% without built-in diagnostics. For these reasons, built-in diagnostics is a standard component 
of modern technical designs. 
3.11 Repair- and maintenance-friendly design 
Accessibility for troubleshooting and repair is an important aspect of service-friendly design in support 
of high operational reliability by quick recovery from failure. Another service-friendly design feature is 
modularity. Modularity refers to the ability of independent testing for proper functioning of a part of a 
system without major rearrangement, partial disassembly, or reconfiguration. Modularity also refers to 
the physical arrangement of the constituents in a way that allows a larger subsystem to be exchanged 
with a minimum of effort. A thoughtful design foresees easy access to internal components for taking 
measurements during troubleshooting. This includes the provision of circuit board extensions to easily 
access measurement points, or the provision of a connector that can be connected to a test module for 
automated troubleshooting. 
4 High-reliability operations 
4.1 General remarks 
Reliable operations that are based on a high-reliability design and implementation are achieved by a 
process of continuous improvements. Many subsystems of an accelerator facility are custom-designed 
systems with few components. They will mature during operation by small improvements and partial 
replacement of weak components. While this process is expected to require a significant effort in the 
start-up years of a facility, it will settle to a lower level of effort after a few years but will persist up to 
the time when larger investments and refurbishment become necessary, when the components arrive at 
the end of their life cycle. 
An important tool for organizing efficient and reliable operation is comprehensive data logging 
and analysis of the performance of all components. The analysis toolkit will usually not be provided as 
part of the construction but its creation is an iterative process, which also requires a certain amount of 
operation time to reach a sufficiently high level of maturity. 
The logged data need to have timing information and the systems should be equipped with circular 
buffers to allow post-mortem analysis. Data should be easily accessible from off-site to allow experts to 
perform analysis and troubleshooting without their having to be physically on-site. 
Root cause analysis is helpful in understanding larger incidents, to prevent them from happening 
again. Commercial software tools are available to support such activities. 
High operational reliability requires well thought-through operational strategies to mitigate the 
impact of failure, in particular, in view of the always-limited operational resources. Important elements 
of such strategies are scheduled maintenance and a preventive maintenance programme based on 
comprehensive monitoring of components and analysis of the data, as discussed previously. 
One way of optimizing the facility output is to develop a figure of merit for operational 
performance and use this to relate any component failure to reductions in performance. This enables one 
to decide rationally whether to interrupt operations for an unscheduled intervention or to run with 
reduced performance until the next scheduled intervention. Part of such strategy is the inclusion of back-
up plans for operating with reduced performance, such as accelerator studies or special operation modes. 
4.2 Preventive maintenance 
With the large number of components and the large diversity of equipment in a large accelerator facility, 
the opportunity for preventive maintenance to replace, repair, or adjust equipment before failure occurs 
is large. Systematic preventive maintenance of each piece of equipment is, in most cases, unrealistically 
expensive, and the effectiveness of such activity is very poor. Preventive maintenance, therefore, needs 
to be properly focused on equipment and use-cases where it will have a high probability of being 
effective in preventing failure. In this section, we will discuss preventive maintenance opportunities that 
have proved effective. 
Mechanical rotating equipment is an obvious candidate for preventive maintenance. Examples of 
such equipment are water pumps, mechanical vacuum pumps, fan systems, air compressors, chilled 
water compressor systems, and turbines in cryogenic cold-engines. Such equipment is needed in many 
industrial installations. Such systems usually come with detailed maintenance plans from the 
manufacturer. Often, preventive maintenance is offered as part of a service package by the manufacturer. 
The preventive maintenance of such systems has been standardized and standards published, for 
example the Society of Automotive Engineers JA1011 standard Evaluation Criteria for Reliability-
Centered Maintenance [6]. 
Another obvious class of equipment are battery-based devices, such as uninterruptable power 
supplies. Batteries have a well-known lifetime in terms of operating hours. Thus, preventive 
maintenance is very effective in such cases. 
It is also obvious that filter systems need cleaning or filter replacement at regular intervals, which 
depend somewhat on the environment in which they have to work. Maintenance plans can be optimized 
after short operation periods. 
Much equipment is cooled by air driven by internal fan systems. Fans should be interlocked so 
that in case of failure, there is no consequent damage to high-power equipment. The lifetime of fans 
should be known, in principle. However, the range of achieved operating hours is quite large. The 
performance and lifetime of fans depends on humidity, dust, and ambient temperature. Therefore, some 
judgement and experience is required to know when to exchange fans preventively, to avoid excessive 
costs or to prevent shutdown of equipment during operations. 
The preventive maintenance that can be carried out on electrical equipment, such as magnet power 
supplies, is somewhat less obvious. Often, these systems have clamps or bolds to hold equipment in 
place. These mechanical fixtures need to be checked from time to time to ensure that all equipment is 
tightly connected, to avoid arcing and other damage to high-power equipment. An efficient method to 
check the integrity of connections that carry a high current is to use thermal imaging (see Fig. 9), which 
allows a large amount of equipment to be monitored in a very short time. Critical equipment can also be 
monitored continuously by a fixed installation; the cost of thermal imaging has reduced dramatically in 
the recent decade. 
 
Fig. 9: Screenshot of thermal imaging of high-current connectors and magnet coils which is a very efficient method 
to check for weak connectors, obstructed cooling channels on magnet coils, etc. 
Water cooling piping at or inside equipment should be regularly checked, since, as pointed out, 
cooling-water leaks are often the root cause of malfunction. A static pressure test will easily detect 
cooling-water leaks that can cause significant damage or downtime. 
Some equipment exhibits sign of wear-out and fatigue. Some thyratron tubes in pulsed power 
equipment announce the end of their lifetime by requiring higher voltages to maintain the discharge 
current. Poor contacts also show increased transition resistance. Latent winding faults on magnet coils 
can be recognized by carefully examining inductive voltages and comparing them with electrical current 
changes. 
The lifetime of piping systems and cooling channels inside equipment is very difficult to estimate. 
Here, it is important to check the water quality—its resistance, oxygen content, and pH—on a regular 
basis. It is also very difficult to estimate the impact of synchrotron radiation on the cooling water and 
the cooling channels. Variable thermal loads may lead to repeated thermal stress, which can cause 
fatigue and subsequent cooling-water leaks, which can be detected by static pressure testing on isolated 
cooling channels. 
Maintenance is labour-intensive and is one of the highest cost elements in operating an 
accelerator. It is important that precious resources are used in the most effective way. This requires that 
maintenance programmes to focus on components with a high-failure probability. Error and failure 
analysis, supported by modelling, can be helpful tools to develop effective maintenance programmes. 
During the start-up of operations of a new facility, it is usual for a large number of teething issues 
on new systems to be addressed; it is difficult to introduce a systematic preventive maintenance 
programme at the same time, owing to limited resources and a lack of data on failure events. Preventive 
maintenance is thus most effective in the mature operation phase. Preventive refurbishment is naturally 
most reasonable if the systems enter the wear-out phase. However the time constants for the subsystems 
are probably different, so that not all operational reliability phases occur simultaneously. 
Next, we will demonstrate, with an example, how the formalism of reliability engineering can be 
applied to decision-making in maintenance activities. Consider a system of 200 components that are 
subject to wear-out. Figure 10 shows the available data on failures that have occurred in components 
within a few years. The failures start to appear after about 200 weeks and the failure rate afterwards is 
accelerated. Do these observations suggest that preventive refurbishment will avoid considerable 
downtime in the future? The data are well described by a two-parameter Weibull failure function 
 
 F(t) = 1 − exp(−(t/τ)α) , 
the parameters α and τ being obtained by a least square fit. We then calculate the mean residual life: 
 MRL = � d𝑡𝑡 ∙ 𝑆𝑆(𝑡𝑡 + 𝑡𝑡0)
𝑆𝑆(𝑡𝑡0)∞0  . 
This allows us to project future failure rates and enables us to make a rational decision on preventive 
refurbishment, to prevent unscheduled downtime (see Fig. 11). The MTBF is about 494 weeks and the 
form factor is α = 6.1. Thus, the system is described well by failures in the wear-out phase. The mean 
residual life at the end of the observation period is reduced to only one-third of the original system and 
is expected to become very small after another operation time of ~200 weeks, which constitutes a high 
risk for unscheduled downtime. In this situation, preventive refurbishment might be considered an 
overall optimum measure. 
 
Fig. 10: Example of accumulated failures (columns) and Weibull Failure function (two-parameter fit, dots) 
 
Fig. 11: Mean residual life as a function of operating time. The mean residual life is expected to drop significantly 
after additional operation time. 
4.3 Speed-up of repair 
The MTTR includes the time to identify a malfunctioning component. This can be quite time consuming 
and cumbersome, as trips and faults that are observed are often only the consequence of a hidden primary 
malfunction. This time may exceed the time for repairing or exchanging a component. The information 
provided about a failure event is thus an important factor in the overall system reliability. The following 
measures have proven to be very helpful in speeding up the troubleshooting and investigation process: 
— Transient recording is based on continuous monitoring with an appropriate data rate, which 
may have arbitrarily short time-scales. Data storage is limited, and this defines a data cycle in 
which the oldest data are continuously overwritten by new data (also called a ‘circular 
buffer’). The failure event needs to provide a trigger that stops the circular buffer and data for 
the time period that precedes the event that can be retrieved (post-mortem data). 
— An asset management database with life cycle data on each component may be very helpful 
in finding the root cause of a failure event. Knowledge of a component’s history (previous 
failures, unusual operating conditions, time in operation, problems with similar equipment) 
provides, in some cases, a clue to understanding a malfunction. 
— Remote access to the process data generated by a system or an item of equipment is important, 
as it tends to save time and cost, since experts may then not need to come on-site to perform 
troubleshooting or to direct repairs, so long as they have access to the Internet somewhere on 
the planet. 
— Having the data from a failure available is sometimes not sufficient. Analysis tools are likely 
to be required if a large amount of data needs to be scanned for anomaly behaviour of the 
equipment. 
— It is worthwhile to maintain a database with information on failures, so as not to be solely 
dependent on the memory of experts involved in resolving past problems. 
— Start-up checklists are helpful, to find malfunction early and to avoid having to repeat a start-
up procedure due to late discovery. 
4.4 Spares inventory 
The availability of spares is crucial for high-reliability operations, as many spare parts require a long 
time for replacement or repair. Therefore, for all breakable equipment of an accelerator facility, there 
should be at last one spare, which is best procured as part of the construction project. For equipment 
with a purchasing lead time of the order of the system MTBF, (which is n times smaller than the single 
component MTBF, n being the number of pieces of equipment in the system) more than one spare is 
necessary to avoid extended downtimes. 
To plan highly reliable operations, it is necessary to determine the rate of consumption of spares. 
The replacement of used spares is a major cost factor in an operations budget. For a system with identical 
components, the failure density distribution of which may be described by the Weibull model, the 
probability of failure of each component in the interval [0,t] is described by 
𝑀𝑀(𝑡𝑡) = 1 − exp �−�𝑡𝑡
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and the probability of surviving longer than t is S(τ) = 1 − F(t). The lifetime τ of a component is defined 
as the time when S(τ) = 1/e. It is identical to parameter b in the distribution: 1 − 1
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Where a = 1 (statistical failures), τ is identical to the MTBF and the lifetime of a system of n identical 
components is τ/n, as shown in Section 2. The annual replacement of spares of a system of n identical 
components is then n/(τ/1 year). 
However, this consideration is only correct where there is an equilibrium in decay and 
replacement. If we have a component with a long lifetime, let us say 20 years, the probability for failure 
in the first few years is very small. Thus the yearly reinvestment of cost per unit × n/τ is unnecessary. 
Therefore, for adequate but economical repurchases of spares, we need to take into account that 
we are starting with a complete spare inventory and that it might take years before the available spare is 
used and needs to be replaced. A compact formula for the replacement of spares over time is given by 
Hoffstaetter and Willeke (unpublished data) and is briefly presented in the following. 
Let us consider a system with n identical components. The failure of components of the system is 
described by the function F(t), which may be modelled using a Weibull distribution. This assumption is 
not necessary for the assessment we are going to make, but it will allow us to calculate examples easily, 
to emphasize the importance of the considerations that will follow. 
We remember that the failure density distribution function f(t) is the time derivative of F(t). We 
will further define the rate of component replacement as R(t) 
𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡) = dd𝑡𝑡 𝑀𝑀(𝑡𝑡). 
We now consider replacements of failed components. The number of initially installed components 
to be replaced after some step in time δt is R0(t)⋅δt = f(t)⋅δt. However, the replaced parts f(t′)⋅δt with 0 < t′ 
< t are also subject to failure, at a rate f(t − t′) at time t, and we have to add these to the list of replacements 
(the infinitesimally small factor δt will be dropped from now on): 
𝑅𝑅1(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡) + � 𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡′) ∙ 𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡 − 𝑡𝑡′)d𝑡𝑡′.𝑡𝑡
0
 
The replacements of the already replaced parts, however, are also subject to failure, so we are left with 
an infinite number of nested integrals: 
𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡)= 𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡) + � 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡′𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡′) �𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡 − 𝑡𝑡′) + � 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡′′𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡′′) �𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡 − 𝑡𝑡′′)� 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡′′′𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡′′′)𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡 − 𝑡𝑡′′′) …𝑡𝑡−𝑡𝑡′−𝑡𝑡′′
0
�
𝑡𝑡−𝑡𝑡′
0
�
𝑡𝑡
0
 
The replacement at time t replaces initially installed components with failure rate f(t), and components 
that were replaced at any earlier time t′ are replaced at the rate f(t − t′). This consideration leads to the 
compact integral equation 
𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡) + � d𝑡𝑡′𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡′) ∙ 𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡 − 𝑡𝑡′)𝑡𝑡
0
 . 
Note that the function f(t) can be assumed to be zero for t < 0. Any other value does not make 
sense, since f(t) describes the failures of parts that did not yet exist at t < 0. Parts that do not yet exist 
also do not have to be replaced, so that R(t < 0) = 0 as well. For this reason, the integrand is 
𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡′) ∙ 𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡 − 𝑡𝑡′) = 0  for  𝑡𝑡′ < 0 and for 𝑡𝑡′ > 𝑡𝑡. 
Thus, we can rewrite the equation as 
𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡) + � d𝑡𝑡′𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡′) ∙ 𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡 − 𝑡𝑡′)∞
−∞
. 
We use the fact that the Fourier transform of a convolution 
� d𝑡𝑡′𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡′) ∙ 𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡 − 𝑡𝑡′)∞
−∞
 
in the time domain equals the product of the Fourier transform of f(t) and R(t). With 
 (𝑓𝑓(𝜔𝜔),𝑅𝑅�(𝜔𝜔)) =  1
√2𝜋𝜋� (𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡),𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡)) ∙ exp[−i𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡]𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡∞−∞ . 
We arrive at 
𝑅𝑅�(𝜔𝜔) =  𝑓𝑓(𝜔𝜔) + √2𝜋𝜋 ∙ 𝑓𝑓(𝜔𝜔)𝑅𝑅�(𝜔𝜔) , 
with the solution 
𝑅𝑅�(𝜔𝜔) =  𝑓𝑓(𝜔𝜔)1 − √2𝜋𝜋 ∙ 𝑓𝑓(𝜔𝜔). 
The replacement function is thus 
 
𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡) = 1
√2𝜋𝜋 ∙ � 𝑅𝑅�(𝜔𝜔) ∙ exp[i𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡]∞−∞ d𝜔𝜔 = 1√2𝜋𝜋 ∙ � 𝑓𝑓(𝜔𝜔)1 − √2𝜋𝜋 ∙ 𝑓𝑓(𝜔𝜔) ∙ exp[i𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡]𝑑𝑑𝜔𝜔 .∞−∞  
Note that 
𝑓𝑓(0) = 12𝜋𝜋� 𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡)d𝑡𝑡∞−∞ = 12𝜋𝜋 , 
and the integrand in the expression has a pole at ω = 0, since 
 
√2𝜋𝜋 ∙ 𝑓𝑓(𝜔𝜔)(𝜔𝜔=0) = � 𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡)d𝑡𝑡 = 𝑀𝑀(∞) = 1 ,∞
0
 
which requires some care in the integration. This pole reflects the fact that for times much longer 
than the lifetime τ, the replacement function approaches the constant 1/τ, so that the time integral 
of R, 𝑅𝑅�(0) = ∫ 𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡′)𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡′,∞−∞  tends to infinity. 
The replacement function for a system with Weibull parameter a = 1 is the constant 1/t over the 
entire range from zero to infinity. For a > 1, the replacement function is zero for t = 0, around t = τ, the 
rate is larger than 1/τ and t will oscillate around 1/τ with a frequency 1/τ and decreasing amplitude. For 
a < 1, the replacement function departs quickly from its start value and approaches zero very slowly. So 
in this case, the replacement will not approach the limit of 1/τ . This is due to the fact that for long times, 
the failure rate is approaching zero. Figure 12 shows the replacement as a function of time for various 
values of a (a = 3, 2, 1, and 0.6). 
 
Fig. 12: Replacement of used spares as a function of time for various system parameters (Weibull parameter a) 
for a = 1 (constant failure rate), a= 2, 3 (failure due to ageing and wear-out), a = 0.5 (early failure). 
Let us consider an example: 
Consider a system that has a certain number of components N. This number N is assumed 
sufficiently large that statistical fluctuations are smaller than the systematic trends. A fraction c1 = 10%1 
fail prematurely, with a lifetime parameter of τ1 = 1 year and a form factor a = 0.4. A fraction c2 = 30% 
has statistical failure characteristics with a lifetime of 20 years and the reminder of the components fail 
because of wear-out, with a lifetime parameter of 20 years as well and a form factor of a = 4. 
The corresponding hazard function λ(t) and the failure probability distribution function (called 
here f(t)) are shown in Fig. 12; the replacement function R(t) is shown in Fig. 13. We see that the 
estimated expenses per unit of time for spare replacement start out much lower than the average 1/τ. 
                                                     
1 This value is intentionally chosen unrealistically large to make the effect more clearly visible in the results. 
 
Fig. 13: Example hazard functions and failure probability distribution. The combined hazard function is calculated 
by Λ(t) = f(t)/S(t) with f(t) and S(t) being the sum of the corresponding partial functions.  
 
     Fig. 14: Replacement of spares over time for a system characterized by the hazard function in Figure 13 
The expected expenditure rate on spares in the first few years of operation (up to about half the 
lifetime) is significantly lower than the average spare consumption rate of 1/τ which is obtained 
asymptotically for a well matured system  lim
𝑡𝑡→∞
𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡) = 1
𝜏𝜏
 . 
The consumption rate will exceed average spare consumption once the equipment reaches the end of its 
life; after this, the cost will approach the average cost while oscillating around the average.  
The integrated spare replacement Is of a large period of t ≃ τ, 
𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡) = ∫ 𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡′)𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡′𝑡𝑡0 , 
will remain significantly below the integral t/τ  which is based on the asymptotic value of the spare 
consumption rate 1/ τ  (see Fig. 15). 
Thus taking the more advanced spare cost analysis into account will release substantial funds for 
planning and addressing other reliability issues as they occur in the early phase of a facility’s life. 
 
Fig. 15: Integrated spare replacement over time is considerably lower than the average spare replacement for a 
mature system with a replacement rate of 1/τ. 
4.5 Human performance factors 
Human performance issues are a topic that greatly exceeds the scope of this lecture. While it should not 
be completely omitted, it is impossible do full justice to this topic, given its importance. Here, we list 
the most important aspects of the impact of human error on the reliability of a facility. A facility with a 
nearly perfect hardware system and nearly perfect controls is fairly insensitive to human error. However, 
the implementation of nearly perfect systems is most certainly not the most cost-efficient 
implementation of operations. For this reason, human intervention is required to keep systems running 
and to handle exceptional events. These interventions are prone to human error. 
Human errors are difficult to eliminate completely but there are measures that can be reasonably 
taken to minimize them. 
— A clear definition of the line of command is mandatory, to handle exceptional operations. 
These need to be communicated clearly and all those involved in operations need to 
understand and accept these definitions. The line of command may not be static but may 
change for different phases and modes of operation. Particular care has to be taken to describe 
the transition from one mode to the other. In particular, the return to normal service needs to 
be addressed. 
— The operational roles, responsibilities, and accountabilities also need to be defined, spelt out, 
and communicated clearly. 
— Operational information needs to be distributed regularly in briefings, and shift turnover 
meetings, to avoid information gaps or misunderstandings, which may lead to failure and 
operational inefficiencies. 
— It is important to set all procedure and operational rules in writing. Care should be taken to 
prepare such write-ups and the consensus of all those involved should be secured. 
— Automation of operational procedures is advisable wherever feasible, affordable, and safe, to 
avoid overloading operators, especially in emergency situations. 
— Facility operators should have a solid base training, which should emphasize the handling of 
exceptional situations. 
— Comprehensive system information should be available online or in the form of hard copies. 
— Operational software should take ergonomic considerations into account. The use of colour to 
convey information is not recognizable by everybody and should be minimized. 
— Obviously a comprehensive, well optimized alarm system is essential, to recover quickly from 
faults and trips. 
— Access to equipment and controls should be carefully optimized. While access limitations 
might stand in the way of quick recovery from a failure, the absence of access limitations can 
be a cause of failures through false settings and misunderstandings. 
— Ambiguous naming is a frequent source of misunderstanding, uncoordinated action, and loss 
of operational efficiency. Names and labels need to be unambiguous. The information on 
naming needs to be communicated well; the wrong use of names may not be ignored or 
considered insignificant. 
5 Closing remarks 
This report intends to provide an overview of considerations that are related to high-reliability operations 
of accelerator-based science user facilities. It would have been beyond the scope of this report to cover 
each of the topics comprehensively. For this reason, this write-up should be considered as an 
encouragement to study the areas discussed in this report in more detail. Quite a number of textbooks 
and scientific and technical publications on reliability engineering, human performance issues, and 
system maintenance are available for further study. 
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